Worlds are Colliding! Explaining the Fictional in Terms of the Real" Philosophical Studies 135 (2007): 65-71.] GEORGE: You couldn't figure out the worlds theory for yourself? It's just common senseanybody knows ya gotta keep your worlds apart…. Worlds are colliding! 1 In the 'Pool Guy' episode of Seinfeld, George is tormented by the infiltration of one of his social spheresthat he shares with his fiancée Susanby people from anotherthat of his slacker friends, Jerry, Elaine, and Kramer. The delicate balance George has struggled to achieve with Susan threatens to be destroyed by this infiltration. In 'Both Sides of the Story', Gregory Currie examines a similar kind of delicate balance between the real world and fictional worlds, together with ways that balance can be upset. The question of what role the artist's actions play in the economy of our interaction with artworks is usually discussed with respect to the question of interpretation: What part, if any, do the artist's intentions play in determining the meaning of the work? Questions about how we understand fiction, on the other hand, have typically been answered with theories of what the audience does when confronted with a work of that kind. Currie shows us something of how these two aspects of fictions are bound up with one another.
The two kinds of explanation that Currie points out we must make use of in order to understand a fiction are internal and external explanations. An internal explanation is one in which both the explanandum and explanans are fictional. Thus, we explain Selma's saving all her money, in Lars von Trier's Dancer in the Dark (2000) , by reference to the expense of the operation her son requires, while we understand that the savings and the operation, like Selma and her son themselves, are fictional. An external explanation is one in which a fictional explanandum is explained by something actual.
Thus, we might explain the temporal and geographical location of Dancer in the Dark -1964 Washington stateby pointing out that much of the emotional impact of the final scene depends on Selma's being executed by hanging, and that this was the sanctioned method of capital punishment in 1964 Washington. 2 Thus we explain the fictional location in terms of the writer-director's desire for a certain effect.
It is worth pointing out, for the sake of completeness, that there are explanations in which the explanandum is actual and the explanans fictional -Charles is sweating because the slime is looking right at him. It sounds odd at first to suggest that something actual might be explained by something fictional, since the fictional does not exist. But, of course, the fictional does exist in some sense. There is no slime that is looking at Charles, but it is fictional that there is a slime looking at Charles. Currie ignores cases like these since he is concerned here only with various kinds of explanations of the fictional.
Quibbles
Currie's subtitle suggests that he is concerned primarily with narratives. But it seems to me that fiction is his target kind. One of his central examples -Hans Baldung Grien's woodcut The Holy Family (1511)is a narrative work only in a pretty broad sense of 'narrative'. If paintings like this count as narratives, then it seems all fictions will. On the other hand, Currie's observations about explanations presumably do not apply to uncontroversial cases of non-fictional narrative. If we are reading an account of how the first explorers discovered the islands of New Zealand, there is no such thing as a 'silly question' in Walton's sense (Walton, 1990, pp. 174-83) . It is always possible to sensibly ask how they navigated their vessels, what the weather patterns were like at the time, how they sustained themselves during the voyage, and so on, even if it is impossible for us to answer these questions. Yet all of these might be silly questions to ask about the voyage of the ship wrecked at the beginning of Twelfth Night. While it is appropriate to consider why the author has chosen to structure a non-fictional narrative in a certain way, it is not appropriate to appeal to the author's actions to explain the events within the narrative.
Thus, I will be discussing Currie's arguments as they apply to fictions, rather than narratives.
I am also a little puzzled by Currie's interest in our tendency to be 'magical externalists'. Currie argues that there are two kinds of externalist explanation. One is actual, and explains the fictional by means of the actual: We ought to imagine that Selma has an eye condition because von Trier makes it clear that we should imagine this, by his use of cinematic conventions, having actors say and do certain things, and so on. The other, magical externalist, kind of explanation is apparently make-believe: We imagine that von Trier has magical powers which he uses to create a world that includes a woman called Selma who has an eye condition. I agree that we unreflectively, and often postreflectively, talk as if we believe that artists create worlds, populate them with real people, cause things to happen, and so on, as if artists were demigods. But, as Currie points out, none of usthe unreflective includedreally believes this. How are we able to explain our verbal behavior, then? With some theory of fiction. Currie seems happy to appeal, like many, to Walton's make-believe theory of fiction, though he has elaborated his own theory elsewhere (Currie, 1990) . But if our theory of fiction explains away our apparent allegiance to magical externalism, we have no need for two distinct kinds of externalist explanationthe actual and the make-believe. As a corollary, when we are being theoreticians I think it behooves us to 'speak with the learned', that is, use the terms of the theory that we think is correct. Thus I favor discussing externalist explanations in terms of actual artists making things fictional by playing a certain role in particular games of make-believe. I don't think this has any serious consequences for Currie's conclusions, I just think the whole picture would be more elegant without the magical externalism.
Kinds of explanation and relations between them
Before moving to a consideration of the various kinds of relation between internal and external explanations, it is worth pointing out that there are artistically relevant explanations of which both the explanandum and the explanans are external to the fictional world. We might call such explanations exterior. For instance, the large number of occurrences of the letter 'c' in the 'Ithaca' chapter of James Joyce's Ulysses (1922) is significant both statistically and artistically. John Gordon has convincingly argued that Joyce intentionally larded the chapter with this letter in order to add yet one more layer to the arcs of the chapter, "from the 'arc' subtended by the walkers at its beginning…to the 'flexed' posture adopted by the sleepers at its end…, from the celestial 'Northern Crown'…to 'the protruding part of the great toenail'…" (Gordon, 1994, p. 45 ). These arcs, recalling Odysseus's bow, "are emblems of homecoming, straight-shooting, hitting the target, satisfactory completion" (Gordon, 1994, p. 46) . Clearly, the shapes of the constituent letters of 'Ithaca' are no more part of the fictional world of Ulysses than those of any (ordinary) novel. Nonetheless, the shape and number of tokens of the letter 'c' are relevant to a full appreciation of 'Ithaca' and its place within Ulysses as a whole.
What discrete succession of images did Stephen meanwhile perceive?
Reclined against the area railings he perceived through the transparent kitchen panes a man regulating a gasflame of 14 CP, a man lighting a candle of 1 CP, a man removing in turn each of his two boots, a man leaving the kitchen holding a candle. (Joyce, 1922, p. 547) Why is the candlepower of the Blooms' gasflame recorded in abbreviated form ("CP")?
In Trier wants it to be fictional that Selma is naïve. But both of these explanations are salient. We need the internal explanation to make sense of the fictional world, but we need the external explanation to make sense of the artwork. I think this harmony between internal and external explanations is probably the most common relationship between the two kinds, and thus deserves a prominent place in any taxonomy of such relations.
Nonetheless, dominance of the external by the internal is possible. Why is Selma represented as (literally) opaque as opposed to transparent? Simply because human beings in the fictional world are opaque for the same reasons people in the actual world are opaque. The external question here -Why did von Trier want his characters to be (literally) opaque?is excluded from being technically silly, since there is always, in fact, an external explanation available for any fictional truth. (This is the same reason internal explanations can never exclude external ones, as mentioned above.) But neither the internal nor the external explanation of this fictional truthlike many othersis salient. This kind of dominance is relatively uninteresting, however, since the request for an external explanation in a case like this is as close to a silly question as you can get in the realm of the external. We might call such questions 'boring' rather than silly.
Tension occurs, it seems, when both an internal and an external explanation are available, and yet they are incompatible. Note that this is a slightly misleading simplification. To take Currie's example, if Pamela is a schemer, then we have an internal explanation of her detailed accounting of gifts, slights, and so on, in her letters.
But there must also be an external explanation of this. Setting this explanation out might require us to take a stand on such contentious issues as the status of authorial intentions in related harmoniously if Currie is right about which pair wins out, as I think he is. One more thing we can observe is that the dialectic that is required to settle which pair of explanations should be favored here is holistic. What is fictional in the work, how this is to be explained internally and externally, interpretations of the work, and so on, all have to be considered in settling the question at hand, even though each has consequences for the others. 3 I revisit this issue below.
Collapse is supposedly a positive kind of tension. We have incompatible internal and external explanations, but we want to hold on to both of them, rather than choose between them. Currie's examples are 'metafictions'works where the artist's role in determining what is fictional is foregrounded within the fictional world.
I am not convinced that these examples belong to a category distinct from those already considered. It is true that they require us to engage in make-believe with a distinct kind of content. We are to imagine that the world of the fiction is one in which something like Currie's 'magical externalism' is truethat objects and events in the world are under the control of a capricious demigod who shares many features with the author of the work. But though these kinds of imaginings make our heads spin, there does not seem to be any tension between the two sorts of explanations we might give of such fictional worlds. Internal explanations will appeal to The Author (a character as fictional as
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern themselves); external explanations will appeal to the author (a person like Stoppard, who is as interested in the nature of fiction as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are in their own nature). These explanations, rather than being in some anarchic relation best characterized as 'collapse', seem better characterized as being in a state of harmony, as glossed above. The theme that unifies them is a concern with the nature of fiction, but this is a matter of their content, and does not, in my view, affect their relation as explanations of a particular fictional world. In order for there to be genuine tension between an internal and external explanation of some fictional truth, the explanations would have to be incompatible. Yet, as noted above, there must be some actual explanation for why something is fictionally the case. But then if the two were truly incompatible, we would have reason to favor the external explanation. This gives us reason to think cases of apparent tension will turn out to be cases of exclusion. But we are not in her shoes. We know that all this evidence has been carefully placed in the fiction, in such a way as to make it all circumstantial or ambiguous, by an intelligent being -Thomas Pynchon. 4 This can induce some slippage between our internal and external explanations of the fictional world. It may seem that we have more evidence than Oedipa, that we know something she doesn't about the evidence she has access to, that it is not ambiguous or circumstantial but deliberately placed in her way. In the end I think this slippage is a confusion. There is no actual evidence, Pynchon only asks us to imagine a world where there is, and in which Oedipa is vainly seeking out its import. But
Pynchon's inducement of this slippage in us coheres with some of his apparent concerns in writing the novelthe poor epistemic position we all seem to inhabit with respect to questions about our own place in the actual world, and its governance by a higher power, or lack thereof.
I would quarrel, then, with the details of Currie's taxonomy of relations between internal and external explanations of the features of fictions. On the one hand, there is an important kind of relation between the internal and external explanations of some fictional truths that Currie leaves out: that where both are salient, and yet in a relation of harmony with each other. On the other hand, I do not see that he has established that there is a genuine relation of tension between some pairs of internal and external explanations, and thus I question the usefulness of the category of collapse also. In addition, I think there is a different kind of explanation worth consideringthe exterior explanation. Nonetheless, the chief value of Currie's paper remainsto point out to anyone with an interest in fictions the richness to be found in a consideration of the various relations between various kinds of explanations of features of those fictions.
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